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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
15635 
KENNETH J. GANDEE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with the crime of carrying 
a concealed weapon, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (1973), as amended, in that said 
defendant did unlawfully carry a weapon, to-wit: a .22 caliber 
pistol concealed upon his person. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury in the Second 
Judicial District Court, in and for Weber County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, presiding. Appellant 
was found guilty on June 9, 1976, of the offense charged. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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On December 23, 1977, the Honorable Judge John F. Wahlquist 
sentenced appellant to serve a term in the Utah State Prison 
not to exceed five years,granting appellant credit for the 
ninety days he had already served. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the judgment of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 9, 1976, appellant Kenneth J. Gandee 
was found guilty of carrying a concealed weapon under the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (1973), as amended. 
The State's primary witness was Officer Corey 
Bott of the South Ogden Police Department. Officer Bott 
testified that on the evening of September 29, 1975, he was 
dispatched to a residence located at 5415 South 800 East 
in South Ogden at approximately 8:30 p.m. to investigate 
, 
a minor family disturbance (Tr.20-22). As Officer Bott turnec 
the corner of 500 South [sic] he heard what he believed to 
be four gunshots in rapid succession (Tr.22). The officer 
parked behind a large Chevrolet camper pickup truck (Tr· 22) • 
and called the dispatcher for backup assistance (Tr.23). 
Officer Bott then observed a man, identified as appellant 
Kenneth Gandee, walking quickly down the driveway of the 
house (Tr.23). Appellant was wearing his shirt untucked 
-2-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and the officer did not see a gun in his hand at that 
time (Tr.23,24,38). When appellant came around the 
front of the truck and proceeded to get in, the officer 
did not observe a gun in his hands (Tr.52,53,62). Officer 
Bott then took his red hand spotlight, turned it on and 
shined it directly into the rearview mirror of the truck 
(Tr.23). Appellant looked into his side rearview mirror 
at the officer (Tr.23), and then started the truck and 
moved away from the curb (Tr.25), with Officer Bott in 
pursuit (Tr.25). Officer Bott turned on his overhead red 
and blue lights (Tr.25), siren (Tr.25), and P.A. system 
and ordered appellant to pull over to the right-hand side 
of the road (Tr.26). Appellant did not respond (Tr.26). 
Officer Bott then drove in front of the truck and pulled 
sideways into the street, thereby blocking it (Tr.27). 
The officer then got out of his car, drew his weapon and 
ordered appellant from his vehicle (Tr.27), to which 
appellant responded, "shoot away, pig." (Tr.28). Officer 
Bott then holstered his weapon, walked around the left 
side of the truck and back up the driver's side of the 
vehicle to appellant's window (Tr.28). 
appellant where the gun was (Tr.28). 
Officer Bott asked 
In response, appellant 
lifted his shirt, whereupon Officer Bott could see the 
-3-
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handle of the butt of the gun (Tr.30). Appellant asked, 
"Is this what you want, pig?" (Tr.30). Appellant had his 
finger on the trigger of the gun (Tr.30). In response,. 
Officer Bott drew his weapon and pointed it at appellant's 
head (Tr.31). A struggle ensued and appellant released the 
gun (Tr.31). 
The gun was a .22 caliber pistol which held 
nine shells (Tr.32). Officer Bott testified that the gun 
was loaded (Tr.32); six shells in the cylinder had been 
fired, but the gun contained three live rounds (Tr.32-33). 
A box of .22 caliber shells was found sitting on the front 
seat of the truck (Tr.22). 
Officer Bott testified that although he could not 
say for certain that the gun was concealed on appellant's 
person because he could not see the barrel inside appellant's 
pants (Tr.49), he believed the gun to have been concealed 
because appellant had to lift his shirt to get the gun 
and that was when the weapon became visible (Tr.49). 
Appellant testified that when Officer Bott came 
up to the window of the vehicle, the gun was on the seat 
beside him (Tr.70), and he simply handed the gun to Officer 
Bott (Tr.71). Appellant also testified that the gun was 
unloaded (Tr.58-59,66,75-76,88,92,96). 
-4-
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Janene Gandee, appellant's ex-wife, testified 
that when appellant left her residence, she saw him 
carrying the gun in his hand (Tr.108). She also testified 
that she talked to Officer Bott approximately 45 minutes 
after the shots were fired. She testified that Officer 
Bott had told her that he was almost physically sick 
because he had almost shot appellant and the gun had not. 
been loaded (Tr.106). 
This testimony was disputed by Officer Bott 
(Tr.116). 
After the defense and the state rested, proceedings 
were held in chambers to discuss the jury instructions (Tr. 
120-127) •. It was the opinion of the trial judge that 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-505 (1973), as amended, carrying 
loaded firearm in vehicle or on street, was not a lesser 
included offense of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (1973), as 
amended, carrying concealed dangerous weapon (Tr.120). 
Counsel for appellant requested that an instruction on the 
ground of Section 76-10-505 be given (Tr.121). However, 
after the trial judge noted that in his opinion appellant 
could be found guilty under both Section 76-10-504 and 
Section 76-10-505 (Tr.121), counsel for appellant stated 
that he would not submit his client to a double offense 
-5-
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(Tr.121). After several changes were made to the jury 
instructions, counsel for appellant stated, "No further 
exceptions" (Tr.127). Moreover, when the court inquired 
of counsel whether there were further exceptions after 
the jury had retired to deliberate, counsel for 
appellant replied that there were none (Tr.128). 
On the afternoon of June 9, 1976, the jury 
found appellant guilty of carrying a concealed weapon 
under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 
(1973), as amended. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY WITH RESPECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-505, CARRYING A LOADED FIREARM 
IN VEHICLE OR ON STREET. 
Appellant submits that the trial court erred 
in refusing to instruct the jury regarding the carrying 
of a loaded firearm in a vehicle or on a street, 
an offense which appellant contends is a lesser included 
offense of carrying a concealed weapon. Contrary to 
the position of appellant, the trial court did not err 
in failing to instruct the jury with respect to the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-505 (1973), as 
amended. Rather, the position of the trial court was 
correct both as a matter of law and under the facts of 
-6-
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the instant case. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-505 (1973), 
as amended), is not a lesser included offense of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (1973), as amended. Moreover, 
the failure of appellant to except to the jury instructions, 
as well as the failure to submit a written request for 
instructions to the trial court, preclude appellant, in 
the instant case, from asserting error on appeal. 
A. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-505 IS NOT A LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-504. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-33-6 (1953), provides: 
"The jury may find the 
defendant guilty of any offense 
the commission of which is 
necessarily included in that 
with which he is charged in the 
indictment or information, or of 
an attempt to commit the offense." 
The major deficiency in appellant's position is the failure 
to address the threshold question: Is Section 76-10-505 a 
necessarily included offense of Section 76-10-504? If the 
answer is in the negative, appellant's first claim of error 
is without merit. 
In State v. Woolman, 84 Utah 23, 33 P.2d 640 
(1934), this Court, in construing Rev. St. 1933, Section 
105-34-6, the predessor statute of Section 77-33-6, stated: 
"The statute allows conviction 
for any lesser offense necessarily 
included in the offense charged in 
-7-
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the indictment or information, 
but does not allow conviction of 
any lesser offense stated in the 
indictment unless it is necessarily 
included in the greater offense. 
The lesser offense must be a 
necessary element of the greater 
offense and must of necessity be 
embraced within the legal definition 
of the greater offense and be a part 
thereof." (Emphasis by Court.) 
33 P.2d at 645. 
In State v. Brennan, 13 Utah 2d 195, 371 P.2d 27 
(1962), the Utah Supreme Court addressed the question of 
whether the offense of driving a motor vehicle under the 
influence of liquor is included in the greater offense of 
driving while intoxicated and injuring another in a reckless 
or negligent manner. In holding that the former was a lesser 
included offense of the latter, the Court stated: 
"The rule as to when one 
offense is included in another is 
that the greater offense includes 
a lesser one when establishment 
of the greater would necessarily 
include proof of all the elements 
necessary to prove the lesser. 
Conversely, it is only when the 
proof of the lesser offense requires 
some element not involved in the greater 
offense that the lesser would not be an 
included offense." (Emphasis added.) 
371 P.2d at 29. 
-8-
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Scrutiny of Sections 76-10-504 1 and 76-10-505 2 leads to the 
conclusion that the latter is not a necessarily included 
offense of the former for the reason that Section 76-10-505 
contains elements which must be proven that are not necessary 
for a conviction under Section 76-10-504. 
In the first instance, the provisions of 
Section 76-10-505 may only be violated if an individual 
carried a loaded firearm in three proscribed areas: in 
a vehicle, on a public street in an incorporated city, 
or in a prohibited area of an unincorporated territory 
within this State. In contrast, the provisions of Section 
76-10-504 are not circumscribed by location;that is, the 
substantive. offense may occur anywhere--in public or private 
buildings, on public lands which are not prohibited areas 
or on streets or roads not dedicated to public use. The 
act which Section 76-10-504 prohibits is the act of 
concealment--not the possession of a loaded firearm in 
certain proscribed areas. Thus, one may be found to have 
1 "Carrying concealed dangerous weapon.--Any person, except those 
persons described in section 76-10-503, carrying a concealed 
weapon as defined in this part is guilty of a class B mis-
demeanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm, or 
sawed-off shotgun he shall be guilty of a felony of the 
third degree." 
2 "Carrying loaded firearm in vehicle or on street.--Every 
person who carries a loaded firearm in a vehicle or on any 
public street in an incorporated city or in a prohibited 
area of an unincorporated territory within this state is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor." 
-9-
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violated Section 76-10-504 for carrying a concealed and 
loaded firearm in a public building and not be in viola-
tion of Section 76-10-505. Section 76-10-505 contains 
the element of location not found under Section 76-10-504, 
and this is not a necessarily included offense of the 
crime of carrying a concealed dangerous weapon. 
Moreover, the term "dangerous weapon" as used 
in Section 76-10-504 is much broader than the term 
"loaded firearm." Section 76-10-501(1) defines the term 
"dangerous weapon" as: 
" • • any item that in the 
manner of its use or intended use 
is capable of causing death or 
serious bodily injury. In construing 
whether an item, object, or thing 
not commonly known as a dangerous 
weapon is a dangerous weapon, the 
character of the wound produced, if 
any; and the manner in which the 
instrument, object or thing was used 
shall be determinative." 
State statutes prohibiting the carrying or 
possession of "dangerous" or "deadly weapons" have been 
held to apply to the carrying of brass knuckles, State v. 
Hall, 20 Mo.App. 397 (1886), blackjacks and billyclubs, 
State v. Hart, 66 Idaho 217, 157 P.2d 72 (1945), and a razor 
Williams v. Commonwealth, 304 Ky. 761, 202 S.W.2d 408 (1947). 
Thus, because one could be convicted of carrying a dangerous 
concealed weapon without that weapon being a loaded f irea~' 
Section 76-10-505 is not a necessary offense of Section 
76-10-504. 
-10-
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In addition, Section 76-10-505 requires that the 
firearm be loaded to constitute the substantive offense. 
Section 76-10-504, however, requires no such element. 
Section 76-10-504 states only that "if the dangerous weapon 
is a firearm, or sawed-off shotgun he shall be guilty of a 
felony of the third degree." 
In State v. Nielsen, 544 P.2d 489 (Utah 1975), 
cert. denied 425 U.S. 906, this Court held that the use 
of the term "gun" as opposed to "dangerous weapon" in a 
jury instruction in a trial for violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-503 (1973), as amended, (possession of a dangerous 
weapon), was not prejudicial error, whether the gun was 
loaded or unloaded. This Court noted, "We believe 
the statute's purpose was to deter those convicted of 
violent crimes from thereafter having guns, loaded or 
unloaded." 544 P.2d at 491. 
Indeed, it is the position of the majority of 
jurisdictions that have addressed the issue that a firearm 
is a "dangerous weapon" whether loaded or not. See 
State v. Quail, 5 Boyce 310, 92 A. 859 (Del. 1914) i 
Reed v. State, 199 So.2d 803 (Miss. 1967); People v. 
Halley, 131 Ill.App.2d 1070, 268 N.E.2d 499 (1971); 
People v. Law, 39 A.D.2d 904, 334 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1972); 
Stctte v. Dorsey, 491 S.W.2d 301 (Mo. 1973). 
-11-
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The Supreme Court of Kentucky in Commonwealth v. Harris, 
344 S.W.2d 820 (Ky. 1961), in construing the Kentucky 
concealed weapons statute, stated: 
"As we view it, one purpose 
of KRS 435.230 is to deter people 
from carrying concealed upon or 
about their persons firearms that 
are mechanically capable of 
producing death upon being fired 
••• We think it in keeping with 
the purpose of the statute to hold 
that a gun mechanically capable of 
being fired is a deadly weapon 
within the meaning of KRS 435.230, 
though it be embodied and though 
there be no ammunition upon the 
carrier's person or so near 
to him as to make it readily 
available." 344 S.W.2d at 821. 
The purpose of Section 76-10-504 is to maintain 
peace and public safety. The Utah Legislature determined 
that the purpose could best be effectuated by the broad 
language of the statute--it did not require that a firearm 
be loaded to constitute a dangerous weapon; rather, the 
Legislature provided that " ••• if the dangerous weapon 
is a firearm, or sawed-off shotgun," the violator would~ 
guilty of a felony of the third degree, indicating a 
legislative determination that a firearm or sawed-off 
shotgun is per se a dangerous weapon. 
Thus, Section 76-10-505 is not a lesser included 
offense of Section 76-10-504 insofar as it requires that Ue 
substantive offense can only occur in specific proscribed 
locations. The term "dangerous weapon" encompasses a wide 
-12-
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spectrum of instrumentalities capable of inflicting 
serious bodily injury or death not proscribed by Section 
76-10-505, and Section 76-10-505 requires the element of 
a loaded firearm, an unnecessary element under the 
concealment statute, Section 76-10-504. Therefore, the 
trial court did not err when it did not instruct the jury 
concerning the offense of carrying a loaded firearm in a 
vehicle or on a street. 
B. APPELLANT IS PRECLUDED ON APPEAL FROM 
ASSERTING AS ERROR THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY REGARDING THE OFFENSE OF CARRYING A 
LOADED FIREARM IN A VEHICLE OR ON A STREET, UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-10-505. 
Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that if one of the parties to an action wishes 
the trial court to instruct the jury on a particular matter, 
such party should file a written request with the court. 
Moreover, Rule 51 provides that if objections are to be 
made to the jury instructions, such objections are to be 
made either before the instructions are given to the jury 
or after the instructions are given to the jury but before 
the jury retires to deliberate. The Rule specifically 
-13-
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provides that "No party may assign as error the giving 
or failure to give an instruction unless he objects 
thereto," although the Rule further states that this 
requirement may be waived by the appellate court if the 
interests of justice so require. 3 
Appellant failed to make his request for an 
instruction regarding the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-505 (1953), as amended, in writing as is required 
3 Rule 51, Instructions to Jury; Objections: 
"At the close of the evidence 
or at such earlier time during the 
trial as the court reasonably directs, 
any party may file written requests 
that the court instruct the jury on 
the law as set forth in said requests. 
The court shall inform counsel of its 
proposed action upon the requests 
prior to instructing the jury; and it 
shall furnish counsel with a copy of 
its proposed instructions; unless the 
parties stipulate that such instructions 
may be given orally, or otherwise waive 
this requirement. If the instructions 
are to be given in writing, all objections 
thereto must be made before the instructions 
are given to the jury; otherwise, objection• 
may be made to the instructions after they 
are given to the jury, but before the jury 
retires to consider its verdict. No party 
may assign as error the giving or the 
failure to give an instruction unless he 
objects thereto. In objecting to the givina 
of an instruction, a party must state dis-
tinctly the matter to which he objects and 
the grounds for his objection. Notwith-
standing the foregoing requirement, the 
appellate court in its discretion and in 
the interests of justice, may review the 
giving or failure to give an instruction., 
Opportunity shall be given to make obje~t~ 
and they shall be made, out of the hear1~ 
of the jury •••• " 
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by Rule 51. Moreover, counsel for appellant apparently 
waived his oral request for such an instruction when he 
stated that he did not wish to subject his client to the 
possibility of conviction for a "double offense" (Tr.121). 
Even if Section 76-10-505 were a necessarily included 
offense of Section 76-10-504, which the State submits 
it is not, appellant's failure to submit in writing the 
instructions he wished to be given and his failure to 
clearly indicate, orally at the least, his continued desire 
to have such an instruction given, precludes his asserting 
the failure of the trial court to so instruct as error. 
In State v. Valdez, 19 Utah 2d 426, 432 P.2d 53 (1967), the 
defendant therein appealed his conviction of assault with 
a deadly weapon on the ground that the trial court erred in 
failing to instruct the jury on the lesser and included 
offense of simple assault. This Court, in upholding the 
defendant's conviction, stated: 
"As a general rule the trial 
court should submit to the jury 
included offenses where the evidence 
would justify such a verdict. But 
like all general rules, there are 
exceptions and it may depend on the 
circumstances. In this case there 
was no request, either written or 
oral, for an instruction on the 
lesser offense of assault. We say 
-15-
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this advisedly after having examined 
the statements of counsel which 
defendant now argues should be deemed 
sufficient to constitute a request. 
If the defendant had desired that 
procedure, it was his duty to submit 
a proper request in writing, or at 
least to clearly indicate to the 
court orally that such was his 
desire." (Emphasis added.) 432 
P.2d at 54. 
Additionally, appellant did not take exception 
during the trial to the failure of the court to instruct 
the jury regarding Section 76-10-505, and thus should be 
precluded from asserting the failure of the court to so 
instruct as error on appeal. In State v. Kazda, 545 P.2d 191 
(Utah 1976), a defendant convicted of the theft of copper 
wire claimed error on the ground that the trial court failed 
to instruct the jury that an honest mistake of fact constitu1 
a defense to the charge of theft. This Court, while agreeinc 
that an honest mistake of fact was indeed a defense to a 
charge of theft, held that the failure of the defendant to 
submit a written request for such an instruction or to take 
oral exception to the instructions given precluded the defenr 
from asserting as error the failure of the trial court to so 
instruct the jury. In so holding, the Court noted: 
"There is an important purpose 
to be served by the rule requiring 
that objections be made to the 
instructions. It gives an 
opportunity for the court to correct, 
or to fill in any inadequacy in the 
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instructions, so that the jury 
may consider the case on a proper 
basis. In order to accomplish that 
purpose, the rule should be 
adhered to. Accordingly, the 
standard rule is that when a party 
fails to make a proper objection 
to an erroneous instruction, or to 
present to the court a proper 
request to supply any claimed deficiency 
in the instructions, he is thereafter 
precluded from contending error." 
545 P.2d at 193. 
The Court further took cognizance of its ruling in 
State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 (1936), wherein 
it had stated that "when palpable error is made to appear 
on the face of the record and to the manifest injustice 
of the accused, the court has the power to notice such 
error and to qorrect the same, though no formal exception 
was taken to the ruling." 60 P.2d at 958. The ~oho Court, 
however, had limited its extraordinary review power to 
capital cases, "and in cases of grave and serious charged 
offenses and convictions of long terms of imprisonment 
involving the life and liberty of the citizen. " 
Id. at 958. Thus, this Court in Kazda, supra, stated that 
"the exception is applied only rarely where there appears 
to be a substantial likelihood that injustice has resulted," 
545 P.2d at 193. Therefore, the general rule is that 
ordinarily the failure to make a timely objection prohibits 
a defendant from raising the issue on appeal. State v. 
Logan, 563 P.2d 811 (Utah 1977); State v. Kitchen, 
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564 P.2d 760 (Utah 1977); State v. Villiard, 27 Utah 2d 
204, 494 P.2d 285 (1972). 
As noted above, Rule 51 provides that this Court 
may, in its discretion, and if the interests of justice 
so require, review asserted errors in the giving of jury 
instructions, although a proper request was not made for 
an instruction and no exception was taken during the trial 
to the alleged deficiency in the instructions. This provisi 
has, however, been narrowly cons trued. The Court has held i 
civil cases that the burden of showing special circumstance: 
which could warrant a departure from the rule precluding 
consideration of alleged errors concerning instructions, 
in the absence of objection thereto, rests on the party 
seeking to vary it. McCall v. Kendrick, 2 Utah 2d 364, 
274 P.2d 962 (1954): 
"Normally, the rules themselves 
must govern procedure and are to be 
followed unless some persuasive 
reason to the contrary invokes the 
discretion of the Court to extricate 
a person from a situation where some 
gross injustice or inequity would 
otherwise result. The burden of showing 
special circumstances which would 
warrant a departure from the rule 
rests upon the party seeking to vary 
it." 274 P.2d at 963. 
While McCall is a civil case, its analysis of 
the application of Rule 51 can properly be considered in 
a criminal appeal. Appellant has pointed to no special 
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circumstances in his case which would warrant this Court's 
departure from Rule 51, and indeed the record in this case 
is void of any such "special circumstances." 
Appellant's failure to make his request for an 
instruction concerning Section 76-10-505 in writing, his 
apparent waiver of his oral request for such an instruction, 
appellant's failure to take exception to the trial court's 
failure to so instruct, and his failure to point to "special 
circumstances" which would warrant a departure from the 
require~ents of Rule 51, preclude appellant from asserting 
error on appeal. 
POINT II 
THE ~VIDENCE PRESENTED IN THE LOWER COURT WAS 
SUFFICIENT FOR THE JURY TO FIND APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT. 
Appellant contends that the evidence presented by 
the State in the lower court was insufficient for a finding 
of guilt by the jury (Brief of Appellant, pp.9-12}. Appellant 
grounds this contention on the fact that the State's primary 
witness, Officer Bott, stated on cross-examination that at 
the time he stopped appellant's pickup truck, proceeded to 
the window of the truck, and looked inside, he could not 
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"honestly" say that the gun had been concealed (Tr.SO). 
Thus, reasons appellant, the State failed to prove every 
element of the offense alleged to have been committed 
beyond a reasonable doubt and the evidence did not support 
the jury's determination of guilt. 
Appellant's argument is without merit for several 
reasons. In the first instance, appellant has unreasonably 
circumscribed the period of time during which the jury could 
have found that the act of concealment occurred. The jury 
was charged in Instruction No. 6 that, "It will make no 
difference whether the hiding occurred while leaving a 
dwelling, entering a truck or during an arrest sequence. 
(R.18). 
The State concedes that the case against appellant 
is based upon circumstantial evidence. It is well establish, 
however, that a criminal conviction may be sustained on 
circumstantial evidence alone. State v. Green, 111 Ariz. 
444, 532 P.2d 506 (1975); People v. Bynum, 94 Cal.Rptr. 241, 
483 P.2d 1193 (1971); People v. Zaring, 547 P.2d 232 
(Colo. 1976); State v. Chapple, 567 P.2d 20 (Idaho 1977); 
State v. Johnson, 220 Kan. 720, 556 P.2d 168 (1976); ~ 
v. State, 552 P.2d 1378 (Nev. 1976). 
In State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 
(1970), the defendant was convicted of second degree murder 
and appealed his conviction on the ground, inter alia, of 
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insufficiency of the evidence. In affirming the defendant's 
conviction, this Court enunciated the standard for reviewing 
the sufficiency of evidence when the conviction is based on 
circumstantial evidence: 
" [W]e survey the evidence 
and any reasonable inferences that 
fairly may be drawn therefrom in the 
light favorable to the jury's verdict 
[W]here a conviction is based 
on circumstantial evidence, the evidence 
should be looked upon with caution, and 
••• it must exclude every reasonable 
hypothesis except the guilt of the 
defendant. This is entirely logical, 
because if the jury believes that there 
is a reasonable hypothesis in the evidence 
consistent with the defendant's innocence, 
there would naturally be a reasonable 
doubt as to his guilt. Nevertheless, 
that proposition does not apply to 
each circumstance separately, but is 
a·matter within the prerogative of the 
jury to determine from all of the facts 
and circumstances shown; and if therefrom 
they are convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt of the defendant's guilt, it 
necessarily follows that they regarded 
the evidence as excluding every other 
reasonable hypothesis. Unless upon 
our own review of the evidence, and the 
reasonable inferences fairly to be 
deduced therefrom, it appears that 
there is no reasonable basis therein 
for such a conclusion, we should not 
overturn the verdict." (Emphasis added.) 
470 P.2d at 247. 
Thus, in reviewing the instant case the Court should survey 
evidence and the reasonable inferences that may fairly be 
drawn therefrom in a light favorable to the jury's verdict 
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and only if there is no reasonable basis for the jury's 
conclusion that the evidence excluded every other 
reasonably hypothesis except appellant's guilt may the 
conviction of appellant be reversed and the case remanded. 
Moreover, it is the prerogative of the jury to judge 
the weight of the evidence and the credibilty of the 
witnesses. The jury was not obligated to accept as true 
defendant's own version of the evidence or his self-
exculpating statements as to his intentions and conduct. 
Rather, the jury is entitled to use their own judgment 
as to what evidence they will believe and draw any 
reasonable inferences therefrom. State v. Schoenfeld, 
545 P.2d 193, 195 (Utah 1976). 
Viewing the evidence presented in a light favonhl 
to the jury's verdict, Officer Bott's testimony that when 
he saw appellant walking quickly down the driveway of 
the residence at 5415 South 800 East in South Ogden and 
observed no gun in appellant's hand (Tr.23,24,38), and 
further that when appellant got in his truck there was 
no gun in his hands (Tr.52,53,62), when viewed in con-
junction with appellant's admission that he fired the gun 
at the residence (Tr.75), it was entirely logical and 
reasonable for the jury to infer that when appellant got 
in his truck, the gun was concealed somewhere on his 
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person. Indeed, if Officer Bott's testimony was believed 
by the jury, this was the only logical conclusion that 
the jury could reach. In accordance with the court's 
instructions, the jury could have found that the act of 
concealment occurred at the time appellant walked to and 
entered his truck. 
Furthermore, the jury could reasonably infer 
that when Officer Bott asked appellant where the gun 
was and he did not see the gun in the truck until 
appellant lifted his shirt, whereupon the officer 
could see the butt of the gun (Tr.28,30), that the gun 
had been concealed under appellant's shirt. As Officer 
Bott stated, "It' was concealed at the time or why would 
he had lifted his shirt to take it out, and that is when 
the weapon became visible" (Tr.49). Although counsel for 
appellant hypothesized that the appellant could have 
lifted his shirt up to get it out of the way in order 
to lift something out of the seat (Tr.49), such a 
hypothesis was clearly not supported by the evidence 
in view of the fact that appellant testified that he 
believed that his shirt had been tucked in (Tr.91), that 
he never lifted his shirt (Tr.91), and that the gun had 
not been jammed down in the seat but was sitting at 
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his side on the seat of the truck (Tr.91). The jury was 
presented with a clear choice of either believing Officer 
Bott of believing appellant. If the jury chose to believe 
Officer Bott, which they obviously did, the only reasonable 
inference they could draw was that the gun had been 
concealed under appellant's shirt. Thus, the fact that 
Officer Bott could not unequivocally state that the gun 
had been concealed under appellant's shirt or in his belt, 
because he could not see the barrel inside his pants (Tr.48), 
does not require the reversal of appellant's conviction for 
the reason that if Officer Bott's testimony of what he did 
see was believed, the only reasonable inference that could 
be drawn therefrom was that appellant had the gun concealed 
under either his shirt, his belt, or both. 
It cannot be contended, and indeed appellant has 
not, that upon reviewing the evidence and the reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom, that there was no reasonable 
basis therein for the jury to conclude that appellant 
was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense 
charged. Such being the case, this Court should not 
overturn the verdict. State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 
470 P.2d 246, 247 (1970). The submitted evidence was 
substantial enough to allow the jury to evaluate it, 
determine the credibility of the witnesses, and fairly 
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conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
The arguments raised by appellant in seeking to 
have his conviction for the offense of carrying a concealed 
dangerous weapon, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (1973), as amended, 
are without merit. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-505 (1953), as amended, is 
not,contrary to appellant's assertion, a lesser included 
offense of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (1973), as amended, 
and therefore the trial court did not err in failing to give 
an instruction concerning Section 76-10-505. Moreover, 
appellant's failure to request such an instruction in writing, 
his apparent waiver of his oral request that the instruction 
be given, and his failure to except to the instructions given 
by the trial court preclude his raising the issue in this 
appeal. Also, the evidence presented in the lower court was 
sufficient for the jury to find appellant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Based upon the foregoing points and 
authorities, appellant's conviction was proper and should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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